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William I. Myers (1891-1976) was one of the early agricultural economists who 
worked on problems of agricultural finance. He was appointed a full professor of farm 
finance at Cornell University in 1920. In 1932, Professor Myers was asked to prepare 
recommendations for a legislative program to solve the agricultural finance problems of 
those tunes. His proposals found approval from President-elect Roosevelt, and his ideas 
formed the foundation for the creation of the Farm Credit Administration and the present 
Federal Cooperative Farm Credit System. Then, at the request of President Roosevelt, 
he was granted a leave of absence from Cornell in March 1933 to serve as assistant to 
Henry Morgenthau, then chairman of the Federal Farm Board. Morgenthau was appointed 
the first governor of FCA, and Myers became Deputy Governor. Then, when Morgenthau 
became Secretary of the Treasury in September 1933, Myers was appointed governor of 
the Farm Credit Administration; He served in that capacity until 1938 when he returned 
to Cornell University as head of the Department of Agricultural Economics. In 1943, he 
became Dean of the College of Agriculture serving until 1959.
The purpose of the W. I. Myers Memorial Lecture is to bring to this campus an 
outstanding agricultural finance economist to lecture on a timely topic. The lecture is 
sponsored by the Cornell University Department of Agricultural Economics as a part of its 
continuing emphasis in agricultural finance.
CURRENT FINANCIAL STRESS: SOURCES AND STRUCTURAL
IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. AGRICULTURE1 
C. B. Baker2
By 1980, only six years ago, U.S. farmers appeared poised for a 
new golden age. They had just experienced a decade of global expansion 
in demand for farm commodities, an expansion in which they had enjoyed 
the lion's share. They had digested sixty years of rapid technological 
change. The digesting process had not been easy. A third of U.S. 
farms had disappeared in the 1950's and again in the I960's. But it 
appeared by 1980 that there would be a demand for U.S. farm output that 
equated with simply at prices that would support prosperity for the 
regaining U.S. farms, perhaps even at levels of non-farm sectors.
Riding the crest of the new era were the aggressive "young tigers" 
who were seizing opportunities generated by the commodities boom of the 
1970's. They were financed by a financial community swollen with 
liquidity for reasons outlined below. Many of the young tigers and 
their lenders now are the victims of failed expectations. How could 
they have been so wrong? Or, given such sharp and recent reversals, 
how can we be so sure that we are right in the gloomy predictions now 
in vogue and so widely accepted?
In my paper I will argue that the failure of expectations has 
arisen from ignoring the agricultural consequences of economic 
development and the internationalization of agriculture and its
1Vl. I. Myers Memorial lecture, Cornell University, October 15,
1986.
2Professor of Agricultural Econcmics, University of Illinois, 
Urbana-Charrpaign.
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financial community, as well as the widely recognized abrupt changes in 
macro economic management. We then will look at same of the possible
structural issues significant for U.S. agriculture and rural financial 
markets.
Agriculture in Economic Development
Perhaps nowhere in the world is the record of how agriculture 
affects, and is affected by economic development more clearly revealed 
than in the U.S. The key is in resources made surplus by increasing 
agricultural productivity. In market-led economic development, 
agriculture is told by chronically declining terms of trade that the 
process requires a continuing diminution in the share of the nation's 
resources allocated to agriculture. This is what is revealed in the 
data of Figure 1. Since 1930, farm income as a percentage of national 
income has declined, on average, by 16 basis points per year.
Half the explanation lies in the consequences of Engel's law, one 
of the few empirically reliable laws of economics. Engel's Law says 
that as income increases the proportion spent for food commodities 
decreases. Secular increases of income produce a continuing decline in 
the income elasticity of demand for food commodities. Income 
elasticities of demand for food commodities are near zero in the U.S. 
and other more developed countries while still high in less developed 
countries with low incomes.
The other half of the explanation lies in the secular increase in 
agricultural productivity. The innovations recounted in the opening
paragraph have positively shifted commodity supply curves across demand 
curves with price elasticities generally far less than unity* The 
result has been high premiums for early technological innovators and
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savere Penalties for those tfeo lag, or «ho fail to leave agriculture in 
response to more favorable conditions elsewhere.
Uranic deterioration in agriculture's terms of trade does not 
mean unrelieved depression in agriculture. Figure 1 reveals episodic 
positive variations, about the declining trend. There is both logic 
and evidence to suggest that these favorable episodes create 
® qpectatians all too readily capitalized into land values, irrplying a 
pernanance in e^ectations that are difficult to justify in view of the 
chronic decline in agriculture's terms of trade.
There is little in these propositions that is not found in T. w.
Sctolltz< Economy, published in 1945, and
further elaborated by E. 0. Heady, in Agricultural Policy TTnrte-r
published in 1962. Subsequent observations
simply support the early insists they provided. Hhat is new, 
especially in the past two decades, is the internationalization of the 
propositions, owing to the spread of agricultural technology, the 
cmsecpent spread of economic develcpnent, and the conversion of closed
economies into open economies. (12)
MOTiatiQml,.Asoects of U.s. Am-iaiU-iTO 
The U.S. food and fiber system now accounts for about one dollar 
in five spent in the U.S. Hie. farm carrponent is only 13% of the 
system. It now is thoroughly internationalized. Farmers buy from 
farm suppliers sell into escort markets as well as to fanners. 
Farmers share a U.S. domestic commodity market with foreign producers. 
As U.S. farmers sell into export markets they compete with local 
producers there and with producers of other exporting countries.
- 4-
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Intemational trad© is managed by a complex of state and parastatal 
agencies as well as multinational firms.
Hie U.S. food and fiber system, farms included, are financed 
through financial markets now largely deregulated and highly integrated 
on an international as well as a domestic basis. U.S. farmers pay 
interest rates influenced by capital intensive economic development in 
Asia and elsewhere, as well as in urban U.S.A. Our own tight monetary 
and loose fiscal policies have revealed consequences that spill readily 
over national boundaries, affecting interest rates everywhere, and the 
exchange values of the U.S. dollar. Debt service burdens Third World 
countries influencing their demand for U.S. exports and threatening the 
solvency of international lenders. We have one^world commodity and 
financial markets. They transmit shocks that heavily influence the 
U.S. food and fiber system and the economic welfare of firms and 
families throughout the system.
A  still smaller part of the food and fiber system is represented 
by research and development (R&D). Yet agricultural R&D, U.S. and 
elsewhere, has a tremendous impact on economic development. The impact 
is on the demand side as well as the supply side for agricultural 
commodities. Economic development requires an economic surplus that 
can be tapped for investments to generate economic growth. In much of 
the developing world, as in 19th century U.S., agriculture is the 
likely source in which the surplus can be produced. Agricultural R&D 
is the triggering mechanism. An economic surplus in agriculture is a 
necessary condition for economic development in countries still largely 
rural. The sufficient condition is using the surplus in 
developmentally sensible ways. Demand for food commodities will
-6-
follow. If comparative advantages are consistent with economic 
development outside agriculture, the demand will be for food imports.
The U.S. in World Agricultural Trade 
The position of U.S. agriculture in the value of world traded farm 
products is suggested in Figure 2. The world recession of the early 
1980’s is reflected in the decline in the value of world agricultural 
exports through 1983. The U.S. share declined as well early in this 
period. Failure of the U.S. to participate more in the 1984 upturn in 
value of world agricultural exports portended the sharp decline in 1985 
in the value and share of U.S. agricultural exports: to about $29
billion for U.S. agricultural exports, compared with nearly $38 billion, 
for U.S. agricultural exports, in 1984.
The adversity of foreign demand for major U.S. agricultural 
exports is reflected in the massive declines in their export value: a 
reduction of more than one-third in the export value of food and feed 
grains plus oilseeds. They are devastating to U.S. agriculture because 
of the importance of these crops in the total of U.S. agricultural 
exports. The decline in value of exports for livestock and livestock 
products is less dramatic. But such exports have been gmai 1 in 
relation to the total. Rebuilding demand for exports will involve
contributing to an increase in the size of agricultural export markets 
as well as increasing U.S. participation in those markets.
Financial Aspects of Agricultural Trade 
Trade is traditionally explained by specialization arising from 
differences among trading units in the opportunity costs of traded 
products. If A and B both can produce c o m  and wheat, but by producing
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c o m  instead of wheat A gives up less wheat than B, A will produce 
c a m  and B will produce wheat. The trading units may be persons, 
regions or sectors distributed within or between countries. The Law of 
Comparative Advantage concludes that products will be produced where 
opportunity costs are least. It is an economic law with a substantial 
basis in actual data, especially within countries that are market 
oriented. Many technologies new in recent decades have reduced 
comparative advantages based on land resources, only to create other 
bases for comparative advantage.
Between countries the effects of the Law of Comparative Advantage 
are modified by political differences.3 Such differences are expressed 
in tariffs and subsidies, in non-tariff trade barriers, and in 
transportation and credit interventions. Countries also differ in 
mcroeconcMic management and thus in level and stability of incomes, 
price levels, interest rates and, notably, exchange rates, values of 
own currencies in terms of the currencies of importing countries and of 
export-competitor countries.
Exchange rates were fixed at the end of World War II in the 
Bretton Woods Agreement, produced to avert the chaos that characterized 
world trade between World Wars I and II. The Agreement was abandoned 
in the early 1970 fs under pressures channeled through international 
financial markets, grown large and increasingly integrated over the 
previous two decades. These markets have since grown apace, influenced
3Latin American have criticized the U.S. and other "center" 
countries for restraining adjustments implied by the Law of Comparative 
Advantage that would share gains from trade with "periphery" countries
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by OPEC trade surpluses during the 1970s and the somewhat related 
increase in lending to less developed countries (LDCs) and centrally 
planned countries by lenders in more developed countries (MDCs) as they 
recycled "petrodollars19 deposited with them by OPEC*
The current state of exchange rate arrangements are given in 
highly aggregative terms in Table 1* Fifteen of the world9 s currencies 
float independently: eight of IBCs and seven of MDCs* The seven of 
MDCs are the currencies in which the vast bulk of the world Ss trade 
and capital transactions are denominated* In addition, these are the 
currencies important in the pegging or other management of the rest of 
the currencies. For example, those identified as "managed floating" 
are defined in terms of currency "baskets" in which the major MDC 
currencies are preeminent. Indeed the Special Drawing Right (SDR) of 
the International Monetary Fund (IMF) is itself based on a basket of 
currencies dominated by the currencies of MDCs identified as 
independently floating.
Exchange rates are important in trade between countries. A 
foreign importer must pay for U.S. exports with TJ.S. dollars. The 
price he pays for a U.S. commodity is determined not only by the dollar 
price of the commodity but also by the price of the dollars in terms of 
his own currency. If for the Japanese importer the price of U.S. 
dollars increases more than the price of Australian dollars, the cost 
to him of U.S. products will have increased more than the cost of 
Australian products unless there are compensating price changes for the 
products in the U.S. and/or Australia.
-10-
Table 1. Exchange Pate Arrangements, by Group of Countries, as of 
December 31, 1985.
More Developed Countries
7 with independently floating
4 with managed floating
2 with pegged
less Developed Countries
8 with independently floating
17 with managed floating
31 with exchange rates pegged to
12 with exchange rates pegged to
14 with exchange rates pegged to
35 with exchange rates otherwise
the $U.S. 
the SDR
the French Franc 
pegged
Source; 3MF' Exchange Pate, Arrangements and Exchange Pate
Restrictions. Annual Report 1986, page 8.
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In the 1970’s the price of U.S. dollars decreased in terms of 
currencies of both inporters and competitors. The size of the 
international market in agricultural commodities grew* So did the U.S. 
share in the total. In 1974 one U.S. dollar was worth, for example, 
only $0.67 Australian. U.S. agriculture became the world’s bargain 
basement for importers of food commodities.
In the early 1980’s foreign demand for U.S. exports has slackened 
as the price of U.S. dollars increased in terms of the currencies of 
both importers and of carpeting exporters. In 1986 one U.S. dollar has 
been priced in Australian dollars at from $1.42 to $1.66. Since 1985 
the exchange values of U.S. dollars have declined again in terms of the 
currencies of importers, though not in terms of currencies of most 
export competitors.
The exchange values of the U.S. dollar are not, of course, the 
only factors influencing the demand for U.S. exports. Perhaps the most 
important factor is income available in countries that import food 
commodities. The determinants here are per capita incomes in the 
importing countries and debt service obligations against that income.
Table 2 gives 1980 population and per capita income for IDCs and 
MDCs, and for categories of IDCs. Also shown are changes since 1980 in 
per capita incomes. Size of population and income changes are 
important factors in the demand for agricultural exports. Lew income 
IDCs are dominant in population (2.1 billion in 1980) but limited in 
demand for world exports by their low incomes. High income IDCs are 
predominantly oil. (or other extractive) exporters. While impressive in 
per capita incomes small populations (17 million in 1980) limit their 
direct influence on demand for world agricultural exports. On the
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other hard the middle income IDCs have an aggregate population 43 
percent larger than that of MDGs. 11187 also have prospects for income- 
based growth in demand for agricultural exports,,
Table 2 divides middle income LDCs between oil inporters and oil 
exporters. Events that enriched the oil exporters in the 1970’s 
restrained incomes among oil Importers. Financing the higher cost oil 
imports contributed significantly to debt levels of oil importers and 
thus to current debt service obligations that limit their demand for 
agricultural exports. At present petroleum prices have moved (cycled?) 
downward, reversing the fortunes of oil exporters vs. oil importers, 
each group having adjusted expenditures to events of the 1970s.
Yearly increases since 1980 in per capita incomes of lew income 
LDCs are impressive when compared with the rest of the world. The low 
income IDCs are dominated in terms of population by the South Asia 
Subcontinent. The Green Revolution has transformed India into an 
occasional wheat exporter, to the consternation of other wheat 
exporters. Yet as an indicator of future economic development such a 
transformation is highly favorable in the longer term for imports of 
food cammoditi.es. In the meanwhile continued aid is needed for this 
country group, with a heavy emphasis on getting food ccammodities to the 
impoverished, and in such fashion as to encourage rather than 
discourage economic development.
An outstanding and persistent issue is management of external debt 
owed by IDCs (and certain centrally planned countries). Net 
international lending grew apace from the mid-1970s through 1981: to 
finance costly oil imports, to finance development projects and later 
to finance debt service obligations. Much of the net lending was by
- 14-
banks (hence at short maturities) and at variable interest rates: low
in real terms through 1980 but then increasing in real terms through 
1984.
Associated with increasing real interest rates, 1980-1984, was 
increasing exchange values of the u.S. dollar, the dominant currency in 
which the external debt is denominated. No wander that Argentina, 
Brazil, Chile and Mexico, to name but a few troubled middle income LDC 
debtors, have been overwhelmed by debt service problems. Rebuilding 
demand for agricultural exports will depend in no small part on finding 
ways to restore their income after debt service and to increase the 
incomes of low-income LDCs. Recent innovations in Chile' s debt
management appear to have promising duplications. (10) And the Green 
Revolution is beginning to produce long term economic growth.
A remedy basic to all other measures is to restrain excessive 
movements in the exchange values of the U.S. dollar with suitable 
macroeconomic policies. Critical to this remedy is restraint in the 
movements of U.S. real interest rates relative to real interest rates 
elsewhere. The task requires cooperation of others among MDCs as well 
as the U.S. It may not be possible to avoid significant restructuring, 
or even write-downs of external debt of some IDCs. It is essential to 
reduce the recurring burden of debt service so that economic 
development can be resumed. Along with those obvious measures is the 
need to maintain open markets for IDC exports. MDCs (U.s. included) 
prosper as LDCs prosper. Finally, it is essential that capital flows 
be reversed: toward rather than from LDCs. (16)
Remedies for low income LDCs are more elusive and more demanding 
in terms of time for results to materialize. The need continues for
- 15-
multilateral and bilateral aid, aid that includes a significant 
agricultural component. Evidence now clearly shows that demand for 
agricultural exports is increased by agricultural aid to IDCs. The 
linkage explaining that result is in the economic development generated 
by the agricultural aid, including P. L. 480. Trade follows aid.
Structural Issues
Structural issues in the farm sector and among farm lenders are 
related because of ways in which the farm economy affects and is 
affected by financial markets and the structure of financial 
intermediaries that serve agriculture.4 
In the Farm Sector
In a country so rich in regional diversity the wide prevalence and 
long persistence of the family-centered full-liability firm speaks 
highly of its adaptability in response to technological and market 
shocks of significant magnitude. It also reflects the institutional 
flexibility of a wide variety of leasing arrangements, partnership 
options and the alternatives made available with Chapter S 
incorporation.
The family-centered full-liability firm remains dominant among 
farm units -vdiose annual sales are between $40,000 and $500,000. It is 
a source of problems in the inter-generation transfer of assets, but 
also a source of stable employment for a substantial though dwindling 
proportion of the nation's labor force. The expectation of capital 
gains from such units has effectively reduced opportunity costs 
required by equity holders that must be met by current incomes,thus 
supporting the supply of food commodities at low cost. Removing
4This section relies heavily on (2) among References Cited.
preferential "tax treatment of capital gains may increase those 
opportunity costs and thus prices of food ccimmodities. Market 
structure assures rapid absorption of new technologies, in sum, the 
family-centered full-liability firm has proven to be a socially 
appealing form of farm organization.
At full equity (i*e. debt-free) the family-centered full-liability 
firm also is a formidable competitor in terms of risk survival. 
However this capability has been eroded by increased enterprise 
specialization and by an increase in the preportion of farm inputs 
purchased from non-farm sources. Since World War II, despite large 
increases of output, the index of total farm inputs has remained 
essentially unchanged. (9) However the index for non-purchased inputs 
dropped by about half while the index for purchased inputs about 
doubled. Because of less price flexibility for purchased vs. non- 
purchased inputs, risks from the farm supply side have increased. 
Oarribined with reduced enterprise diversification, the family-centered 
full liability firm is subject to substantially increased structural 
risk in production. This increase is offset somewhat for some units by 
such technological factors as irrigation and "over" mechanization.
In any event many family-centered full-liability farms now are 
subject to financial stress, the outcome of failed expectations 
represented in land and machinery purchases during the commodity boom 
of the 1970*s, financed with borrowed funds. In 1984 Boehlje reported 
in his Myers Memorial lecture that "financial stress is not unique to 
any particular size farm." Thus the 20% of farmers who owed 40% or 
more of the value of their assets also owned 20% of farm assets. 
However they owed 63% of farm debt. The eight percent of farmers who
- 16-
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cfwed 70% or more of the value of their assets owned eight percent of 
farm assets. But they owed 31% of farm debt. Thus while the incidence 
of debt was equally distributed among size groups, the amount of debt 
appears concentrated. There also is a concentration of debt in Middle- 
West and Great Plains agriculture, the direct effect of eroded demand 
for exports of corn, wheat and soybeans.
There also may be a difference between size groups in capacity to 
manage risk. Many units with sales of less than $40,000 generate 
chronically negative cash flows. However they provide other utilities 
to owners, many of whom have other important sources of income. The 
farm is but a part of the portfolio of its operator. Many farms with 
annual sales over $500,000 survive because of risk sharing on the 
of shared equity, in one form or another. Many of these also are farms 
organized with labor and management resources in excess of those 
furnished by the operator and his family. Thus it is that financial 
stress has focussed so sharply on family-centered full-liability farms 
that are highly levered.
Hie 1950's and 1960's were the growth decades in the farm sector. 
From 1951 through 1960 farms disappeared at an average rate of 3.5% per 
year; from 1961 through 1970, at 2.9% per year. In contrast annual 
disappearance in the 1940's averaged only 1.2%; in the 1970's, a mere 
one percent. Ironically, farm disappearance has grown again in the 
1980's to near the rate of the 1960's though now in response to 
financial stress rather than to off-farm income opportunities.
Mach of the growth in farm size in the 1950s and 1960s was 
accomplished by operators who added rented to owned land. land value 
as a percent of farm asset value grew in those decades at the slow rate
-18-
of 0.55% points per year, (2) In the 1970s growth was accomplished by 
operators who added purchased to owned land, bidding up land prices in 
expectation of capital gains. The rate of farm disappearance was far 
less than in the 1960s. However from 1971 through 1981 land as percent 
of farm assets grew at the rate of 0.8% points per year (2). The farm 
sector was left with highly levered operators distributed among all 
size groups, and drained of liquidity. In 1950 deposits and currency 
plus U.S. savings bonds were more than 10% of total farm assets. By 
1982 they had declined to less than 2%.
Financial stress in the farm sector has numerous structural 
effects: interregional and among farm types, owing to variations in 
export dependence, capital intensity and diversification in portfolios 
of income streams? and tenurial and business organization, owing to 
variations in risk-sharing advantages associated with equity sharing 
arrangements. Pervasive risk increases appear likely to increase 
everywhere the survival values of liquidity management.
None of these survival attributes seems necessarily related to 
farm size. Hence it is not clear that the prospect of a dual size- 
structure for the farm sector is all that imminent. It is true that 
the percentage of farms sales over $500,000 grew from 0.1 to 1.0 
between 1969 and 1980. However the Consumer Price Index also nearly 
tripled in that period, and the percentage of farms in this size class 
has not increased appreciably since 1980. The percentage of farms with 
sales between $40,000 and $500,000 grew from 6.7 to 26.8 between 1969 
and 1980, but by little since 1980. The percentage of farms with sales 
less than $40,000 declined from 93.2 to 72.2 between 1969 and 1983 and 
has continued to decline since. (8)
- 19-
Amoner Farm Landers
U.S. fanners are served by a four-part lending system. They share 
with the rest of the economy a highly diversified banking system 
presided over by a decentralized Federal Reserve System with 
obligations in money management that are formal domestically and 
implied internationally. The implied obligations arise from the 
international role of the U.S. dollart as desertbed above, and from 
regulatory obligations with respect to U.S, banks, those stressed by 
loans to foreign borrowers and those stressed by troubled dnnratjn 
loans.
A second component consists of life insurance companies. Some 
companies make farm mortgage loans from reserves they hold to meet 
obligations to policy holders. Organizational structures vary widely 
among companies. As a group, life insurance companies tend to be 
selective as to areas of activity and cyclical with respect to farm 
mortgage lending intensity.
Since the Great Depression (and earlier for farm mortgage lending) 
fanners have been served by the Cooperative Farm Credit System, with 
its capacity to acquire funds from the sale of consolidated debt 
instruments that are the joint liability of all units and districts of 
the Farm Credit System. The System has long since retired the stock 
with which the federal government capitalized System units. However, 
under current stress it is likely that government resources remain 
available if needed, though conditions and terms of use are still none 
too certain.
The fourth ccrcponent is the public sector, dominated by the 
federal government8 s Farmers Heme Administration (EtriHA) and the
-20-
Coiranodity Credit Corporation (COC) . The FraHA is a gcvernment-awned 
lerKler-of-last-resart, and an instrumentality used by the government to 
ma3ce emergency loans to finance recovery from identified disasters. 
The COC mates non-recourse loans on ocerrEnodities stored by farmers who 
participate in price and income programs. Thus the CCC loan program is 
addressed more to price and income policy than to agricultural finance 
policy.
£s in the farm sector, so also among farm lenders, the current 
financial stress in agriculture carries the potential for change within 
as well as among each of the four parts of the farm lending system. 
Among banks, the incidence of stress from farm loans depends greatly on 
the structure of the banking system. A brief example will illustrate 
(14). In 1984 defaults plus non-performing farm loans as a percentage 
of year-end farm loans was 2.2% for U.S. banks as a whole. For 
California, it was 6.1%, by far the highest for any state. For Iowa it 
was 2.9%, Illinois, 1.9%, Among banks with past-due plus non
performing loans that exceeded total capital in 1984, farm loans as a 
percent of total loans was 7% for the U.S. as a whole. In California 
it was a mere 1%, for Iowa, a whopping 44%, and for Illinois, and 
intermediate 11%. The differences in stress among banks lies in the 
diversified portfolios of California banks that are branched state­
wide, as compared with the dominantly unit banks of Iowa and Illinois. 
The stress level among Illinois banks is less than in Iowa, owing to a 
more diversified portfolio of loans in the case of Illinois banks. (5) 
The same problem exists in the Farm Credit System, though 
exponentially greater because of a nation-^wide portfolio that is 
essentially specialized in agricultural loans; farm and farm-related
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firms. Geographic diversity provides same relief. Formal provisions 
in tiie System's organization seem adequate to exploit the geographic 
and the loan type diversity that exists (4). However, resistance to 
inter-district and inter-unit risk pooling developed in the post-World 
War II growth decades, decades largely stress-free in terns of debt 
repayment and collateral problems.
All this has turned around since 1981, with profound and far 
reaching consequences for the informal rigidities ai&l current 
litigations that have developed in the operation of the System. There 
clearly is need to reexamine the organizational structure of the System 
including all aspects of its capitalization, reserve requirements and 
liquidity management.
The greater the specialization of the lender to agriculture the 
greater is the need to develop risk response mechanisms. For both the 
banking system and the Farm Credit System, the most visible alternative 
is to diversify loan portfolios. For banks, branching or carrparable 
structural change is a plausible remedy, though limited in rural arms, 
given current banking legacies. However, such a remedy could well 
further increase the volatility in the cost of capital to farmers, 
since it would reduce still further any structural insulation of 
farmers from competition with nonfarm borrowers in financial markets. 
So long as the Farm Credit System is restricted to agricultural 
lending,the principal relief in loan diversity is to further reduce 
inpediments to inter-district and inter-unit risk sharing. Differences 
in risk premiums presumably would be reflected in much greater interest 
rate variation among units than now exist.
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Fran-these hi#tly visible remedies there doubtless would follow 
M o t i v e s  for increasing the provision of capital with equity 
instruments s an es^ansion of leasing in farm land and other forms of 
capital as well, and perhaps a decline in the dominance of the full 
liability firm. The result would preserve the flow of capital to 
agriculture and distribute risks to other equity holders as well as to 
farm operators. Such results seem highly likely and need not be 
socially undesirable. (6) let me conclude with another partial remedy 
with great social appeal; to build liquidity in the farm and farm 
lending sectors to counter the accelerated risks that seem to be with 
us for the foreseeable future. (2)
^  Partial Remedy
The proposal is a pool of liquidity between the borrower and 
lender, dedicated to debt service. Its appeal is related to the risk 
inherent in the financing transaction, tailored to local conditions, 
with little or no cost to participants, with gains to both borrower and 
lender, and at zero cost to the public sector. I refer to it as a Debt 
Service Reserve Fund (DSRF) plan.
The DSRF would R e f u n d  dedicated to the management of debt 
service obligations, the size of the fund a multiple of the periodic 
debt service obligation assumed by the borrower in a debt contract. 
The size of the fund would vary with the amount of periodic payment, 
the type of farm financed, and the financial condition of the borrower. 
It would be related positively with risk among farm types and farmers.
The initial DSKF for a given loan would be established as a part 
of the loan disbursement, (3) and would require an increment added to 
the total loan approved. However, the net cost added for the borrower
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would be dampened by a return on the DSRF at a rate of interest equal 
to what he pays on the farm mortgage loan. Hence the net added 
pfyrjrY^ in cost actually turns out to be the amort i. z at ion on the 
increment of principal that is added by the DSRF. It could be offset 
easily by lengthening the maturity of the loan contract.
The DSRF would constitute a liquidity buffer to protect the lender 
from repayment failures originating in periodic deficits in the 
borrower's net cash flow. It would protect the borrower inasmuch as it 
would provide an extra source of liquidity dedicated specifically to 
meeting debt service obligations.
If drawn down by the lender to supplement borrower amortization 
payments, the DSRF later would be replenished with payments by the 
borrower in periods of net cash flow "surpluses." The borrower would 
benefit from added credit, based on financial security, as well as from 
the direct protection from lender options that are activated lay 
delinquency and default.
Hie operation of the DSRF is best seen with an exaitple based on a 
simple version of the plan. (2)
let Farmer F buy 300 acres for $1,500 per acre, subject to a farm 
mortgage loan at 60% of the purchase price: i (= annual interest rate)
- 12%; m (=maturity of loan) = 3 0  years. Thus the purchase price is 
$450,000 and the farm mortgage loan, $270,000. The annual debt service 
Alf is $33,519.5
Set the DSRF at 3 ^ ) :  3 x $33,557 = $101,1879. The loan
including the DSRF then becomes $270,000 + $100,557 = $370,557. The
5$270,000/Uniforra Series Present value factor for i = 12% and 
maturity = 30 years.
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disbursement is $270,000 to the borrower and $101,557 to DSRF, where it 
earns for the borrower, R (DSRF) = $12,067 (=$100,557 x .12). The debt
service, A2, based on a loan with the DSRF is $46,002.® Thus the net 
debt service, A, is:
A  = A2 - R (DSRF) = $46,002 - $12,067 = $33,935. Assuming a net 
mean© before debt service equal to $50,000, Farmer F's net cash flow 
would be $50,000 - $33,935 = $16,065. In addition he would gain $1,535 
in equity in Year 1 based on payment of the principal component of the 
debt service installment, assuming no change in the DSRF.
If, in Year 1, his net cash flow exceeded expectations, F would
retain the excess, because the DSRF is at the prescribed level, if in 
Year 1, it were less than expectation, A would be reduced (by
application of an index) in proportion to the shortfall, the lender
drawing on the DSRF to offset the deficit. F world retain a net cash
flow of $16,065.
For any year t, begun with a IKRF of less than $100,557 (= 3AX) F 
mXLd be required to pay into the Fund in proportion to any excess of 
realized net cash flow over expected net cash flew, subject to a limit 
of the greater of (a) the amount of the excess or (b) $100,557 - 
nSRFt„x. when the DSRF, plus undisbursed interest, is equal to the 
farm mortgage loan balance, it is applied to retire the loan.
Ihe plan is subject to choice among many design specifications 
(8)s the size of the DSRF, the manner in which it is initially 
established, the basis on ^iich increments or decrements are called 
for, the calculation and management of returns on the DSRF, and its 
final disposition. The central theme that nans through any design, 6
6$370,557/8.0552.
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however, is that the size of the DSKF should be positively related to 
risks the hi^ier the risk inherent in the loan contract ? the higher 
the EGEF. Sara features of the BSEF plan have been introduced before* 
But to w  knowledge, they have always been optional with the borrower 
and limited to .applicants perceived to be at the upper end of the scale 
in terms of loan quality. In the envisaged plan, the BSEF would be 
applied in proportion to perceived risk and even might become a 
condition to loan approval in certain circmBtanoes.
Simulations at the University of Illinois suggest soma of the 
gains that might be aeMeved wife a DSKF plan. (1) Data from m m  
borrowers were used to compare failure rates, amounts defaulted, growth 
rates and liquidity performance under conventional and DSKF repayment 
plans, the data were drawn from borrowers in 1978. Ihe sbmxLatians 
varied by scenario in commodity and land prices, by initial liquidity 
of fee borrower, and by DSKF specification. Ihe most severe of the 
price scenarios was not as severs as has since materialized® However 
DSKF specifications also were limited to 2 x amortization and, more 
importantly, initial liquidity was specified at a relatively high level 
for M  borrowers.
She DSKF was found generally to reduce fee probability of failure, 
to reduce fee amount defaulted, increase growth rates and to increase 
balance sheet liquidity as measured by fee ratio of current assets 
(exclusive of fee debt reserve) to current liabilities. Under the most 
severe of fee price scenarios tested a debt reserve set at twice fee 
annual amortization was found most effective for all performance 
measures. Failure rates were reduced by 16 percent, default amounts by 
nearly $33,000. Growth rates and liquidity improved substantially.
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A further contribution of the DSRF is capital with sane attributes
of risk capital for the lender. In the CFCS borrowers now are required 
to buy stock at a. fixed percentage of amount borrowed. While formally 
lsat risk" in practice it is not subject to impairment. In contrast, 
the BSKF, in amounts determined by interest rate and maturity, would 
provide a much larger sum in total (see Table 3), and dedicated to 
offset risks from loan loss.
Table 3. capital provided by DSRF per $1,000 of loan at selected 
loan maturities and interest rates; DSRF at 3 x amortisation.
At maturity Annual interestof “lof— 12%
20 years 352.38 401,64
30 years 318.24 372.44
The DSRF proposal is not purported to be a complete remedy for a 
stress event of the magnitude of the current one or that of 60 years 
ago. Yet it does provide support where most needed, liquidity- 
dedicated to debt service. Such support is especially needed by the 
family-centered commercial farm, where liquidity is a highly valued 
attribute, and for farm lenders whose loan portfolios are likely to 
lack the stability that comes from diversification.
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